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Statement
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK]
to
the Communist Workers' Party of Denmark, July 1978
by
Nuon Chea
Deputy Secretary, CPK
On behalf of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, I wish to express our deep thanks for your visit to Kampuchea. It is a great honour and a source of encouragement for us to have you here...
I. On
Party-building 1960-67
From
the beginning we believed it was necessary to have a party led by the working
class and to base ourselves upon the contradictions in Kampuchean society. In
that period, that is, in 1960, Kampuchean society was neo-colonial and
semi-feudal. The contradiction between the Kampuchean nation and US imperialism
was very sharp. That was the external contradiction. As for the internal
contradiction, it was between, on the one hand the working class and the
capitalists and on the other the poor peasants and the feudal class. At that
time, capitalists and reactionaries together oppressed our people.
On the
basis of these contradictions, the party determined its revolutionary tasks: to
make the national democratic revolution; to fight US imperialism and the feudal
class; to liberate the Kampuchean nation and the poor peasant class. It laid
down this strategic line for the national democratic revolution:
(1) The
party leading the revolution had to be a party of the working class. It had to
lead the revolution directly and not allow other classes to lead the revolution
or the party. The party had to define the forces of the revolution; firstly,
the strategic forces in the revolution and secondly, the tactical forces in the
revolution.
(2) Strategic
forces are the workers, peasants and some of the petty bourgeoisie. Of these,
we see the working class, as basic class while the petty bourgeoisie was
something like allied force. National capitalists were supplementary forces.
Moreover, we regarded some high-ranking personalities within the ruling
Class-some big capitalists and officials in the civil service and government,
and some Buddhist monks -as supplementary forces. Those people had to have a
patriotic, progressive and national outlook, that is, progressive in relation
to the reactionaries.
Based on this classification of forces, we tried to construct a national democratic front for the purpose of struggling against US imperialism and its lackey. We wish to stress to you that all of these forces depended upon the leadership of the working class and the party.
(3) Our
party chose two forms of struggle: political struggle and armed struggle. These
are interrelated. The political struggle was promoted through legal struggle
and illegal struggle, with the illegal being the basic from of struggle. Now we
struggle openly and in secret with secret struggle as the basis of our
struggle. We define the forms of struggle in this way as a result of our own
experience. Defending, expanding and building our forces required working in
this way.
(4) We took
up the struggle in the city as well as in the countryside.
(5) The
struggle in the countryside was the basic one, especially the struggle in the
most backward and remote areas. Those were base areas.
(6) We
recognized that we had to conduct people's war, to overcome all obstacles, make
any sacrifice, so as resolutely and finally to win victory and to launch a
final offensive. We resolved never to put ourselves on the defensive but always
to take the offensive.
(7) Our
strategic line took as its premises: independence; sovereignty; self-reliance.
It was based upon the right to choose our own destiny with dignity.
(8) Our
struggle was based on international solidarity with all brotherly parties in
the world and with all peoples and countries in the world who oppose
revisionism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and colonialism of any kind.
These principles and practices are not new. They have been recognized around the world, but we review them with you because they reflect our own experiences. We have followed these principles in our struggle and we have learned from them. This line was adopted by the first congress of our party on 30 September 1960.
I would
like to stress that putting this line into practice was not easy. Especially
before 1970. In 1960, we were badly affected by the twentieth party congress in
the Soviet Union. Vietnam also opposed our party line especially the armed
struggle, as well as our line of independence, sovereignty and self-re1iance.
The Vietnamese said we had to make the national democratic revolution on the
basis of the documents of the twentieth congress in the Soviet Union. They said
it was not clear how the classes in Kampuchea had to be divided. They believed
the feudal class had a progressive function in Kampuchea and that it would be
able to make the revolution with us. Moreover, they thought the revolution
could be achieved through the parliament and on the basis of co-operation among
different classes. Then and now, they saw and still see our line as putchist
and too much to the left. But we defended our party line. Having correctly
defined our party line and our party activities, we sent most of our cadres to
work in the countryside. We kept only a few in the cities.
Our
army was built from scratch, from a small army to a big army. In the beginning,
we created some secret self-defence corps. We selected the best youth. Almost
all cadres had to do illegal work at that time. Only a few worked legally; some
in the parliament, some in the administration, some in the press. The legal
work was for the purpose of mobilizing popular forces but the basic work was
the work done in the countryside and among the workers; it had to be done
illegally and secretly. This meant that our enemies-the US imperialists, their
lackey and the reactionary classes - could not find out who was leading our
revolution. They knew the names of a few comrades such as Khieu Samphan.1
They thought those comrades were the real leaders of the revolution. But they
did not know the real leaders. And as they could take action against known
people only, most of our leaders were able to work safely.
During
1960-67, we organized and consolidated many bases in the countryside. The
movement in favour of production and against land- owners was very strong.
Peasants pitted their strength against the ruling class. They had nothing but
used everything: stones, knives, sticks, axes. Some of the wives of poor
peasants participated by taking their children to demonstrate in front of the
National Assembly. Revolutionary forces in the rural areas were very strong
then. We let our party members from the working class go there to work among
the poor and middle peasants.
In the
cities, there was a related movement among workers and students. They demanded
that the government cut off US aid and kick out the US ambassador. Demonstrators
burnt the US flag and the embassy.2
- In
the countryside, the movement of the people ignited. Those who were hungry rose
up against traitors, reactionaries and agents of the administration. The slogan
was 'Make the National Democratic Revolution', that is, fight US imperialism.
The spirit of patriotism was very high. Everybody felt they had to fight US
imperialism. But we divided the struggle into two parts: the national struggle
and the democratic struggle. In the latter, we raised slogans demanding rights
for students, workers and peasants; higher wages; land to the peasants; better
prices for rice, bean curd and meat and better living conditions for the
people. The struggle embraced big issues and small and involved all regions and
means. The enemy tried to suppress us but failed because we fought legally and
secretly, big and little battles at the same time. In this way, we were able to
defend and strengthen revolutionary forces step-by-step.
-Through struggle, we built up the leadership of the party, recruiting good cadres from among the workers, peasants, civil servants in the administration, Buddhist monks and women. In struggle we were able to temper cadres from all strata. Thus the contradictions in our society deepened, the contradictions between workers and capitalists, between the peasants and landlords, between workers and government officials. The enemy tried harder to suppress our movement. In this situation, confronting these acute contradictions, we had a Central Committee meeting. We decided we could no longer continue the legal struggle. And that we had to start the uprising. This was in January 1968.
The
Soviet ambassador in Phnom Penh opposed us. The Soviets said our party was out
of its mind to launch armed struggle. They began to build a new party aimed
against us, gathering people who had surrendered to the enemy and who were
traitors, opportunists and vagabonds. Vietnam also opposed our armed struggle.
Vietnamese cadres took action against us, by sneaking around giving our cadres
pamphlets such as Lenin's Left-Wing
Communism: An Infantile Disorder. They said we were too left.
We tell
you this in order to point out that Vietnam did not help us! A lot of people
misunderstand this. It was at tcl1at moment that our party consolidated its
position as independent and sovereign. We realized our case was different. We
had to take account of the concrete situation in order to resolve our social
contradictions. Perhaps it is different in other places, but this is what it
was like here. We had to determine our line on the basis of our own
contradictions. The situation was favourable for armed struggle. Because our
party was united on this principle and this line and our people supported the
revolution wholeheartedly, the uprising against the ruling classes began in 17
out of 19 provinces. We had no weapons to speak of and no aid from outside. We
had only a few carbines captured from the enemy. Sometimes we had weapons but
no ammunition. Sometimes even if we had no ammunition we carried rifles so as
to frighten the enemy. Step-by-step we were able to expand our forces because
we followed the party line of people's war.
The
people gave us support by hiding food and by hiding our guerrilla forces and
cadres. This taught our cadres to be vigilant in following the party line of
combining with the masses and relying upon the masses. Our army was not very
big then. It fought with bows and arrows, especially in the northeast base
areas. We gained the confidence of the people by showing them that traditional
weapons could kill the enemy. The people then believed in the party line and in
the revolution. The enemy used all kinds of weapons especially in the
north-east where our Central Committee had its base. But this region was very
strong; the enemy could not do a thing to us. However, the Vietnamese
revolution was in trouble then because the enemy had built strategic villages
in South Vietnam. Having no land to escape to, the Vietnamese asked us for
refuge and got it. This led to the 18 March 1970 coup d'état of the US.
The US
sought to destroy our revolution, but as we were strong, we began establishing
our own state power in the liberated areas. We were successful immediately in
70 per cent of the rural areas; if the US had not invaded, we could have
liberated the whole country by June 1970. In 1967-68 many people said we were
ultra-leftist; in 1970, everyone agreed we had the correct position. Everyone
followed us. Socialist countries and other countries around the world supported
us, enabling us to continue our economic, military and international work
better than before. But I would like to stress that even with favourable
conditions we kept the existence of our party secret and we continued to build
upon the secret struggle as a fundamental tactic. We became masters of the
situation because we had our bases in the rural areas, and because we had the
forces of the united front.3
At
first, we did not notice our contradictions with Vietnam. To be frank, we
thought the Vietnamese were our friends. But instead of helping us Vietnam came
to seize forces, to build up its own forces and to grasp our party as a whole.
There were lots of difficulties. We had to fight the US-Thieu forces sent to
help Lon Nol, while at the same time they tried to stab us in the back. Our
party, of course, decided to resolve the principal contradiction first that is,
to win victory over Lon Nol.
The
contradiction between us and Vietnam deepened towards 1973 when Vietnam united
with the US at the negotiating table. The US immediately imposed conditions,
obliging Vietnam to pressure Kampuchea to come to the negotiating table. They
tried but we refused. The Vietnamese then made every effort to undermine our
revolution. Meanwhile, as Vietnam and Laos laid down their arms, the US
mobilized all its forces to bomb Kampuchea ? all its forces in South-East Asia!
? for 200 days and 200 nights, to force us to the negotiating table. Our party
was resolutely opposed to kneeling to the US. Had we done so the Lon Nol
traitors in Phnom Penh would have gained time to build up their forces. We
decided to struggle to the end. We were in any case able to resist the US air
war, and by defeating the US air war confidence grew in our party line. More
and more people were convinced that our line was correct I must make clear that
awareness of the party line did not come overnight or through theoretical
studies. It grew as a result of the concrete experiences and suffering of the
people and as a result of class hatred. It was only through practice that
understanding of the party line deepened.
In
1974, the year after the air war, our party decided to launch the final big
offensive, to liberate Phnom Penh and the whole country in the dry season of
1975. Vietnam was naturally informed. The Vietnamese believed the US would not
allow us to win. Moreover they were not prepared to allow us to have victory in
advance of their victory. Consequently, they refused to transport ammunition
being sent from China and other countries, but especially from China. We had to
use ammunition captured from the enemy; we received nothing from Vietnam. The
Vietnamese opposed our winning because they wanted to liberate Saigon and then
send their forces to liberate Phnom Penh, to build up a political apparatus
here and to create a new party, thereby eliminating the Communist Party of
Kampuchea and establishing an Indochinese Federation.
In
spite of these difficult conditions, our party did its best and liberated Phnom
Penh on 17 April 1975, two weeks in advance of the liberation of Saigon. Once
we had liberated the whole country and secured our independence and
sovereignty, that is in June 1975, the Vietnamese sent their troops to occupy
our island, Koh Way. We defended it and forced Vietnam to withdraw. What we
want to make clear to you is that, throughout the period of national democratic
revolution, there was a hard, complicated struggle involving difficulties with
the Soviet Union and Vietnam but we overcame these and won victory.
Question: At the
time of the founding of the Communist Party, was there any discussion of the
political line for the period leading to communism?
It is
written in our party programme that we shall continue our socialist revolution
and advance towards communism after the national democratic revolution, but we
did not go into details. We worked out our present tasks of socialist
construction after liberation.4
Our
main tasks are to defend our state power and to continue the socialist
revolution and socialist construction. We have defended our territory and
sovereignty since liberation in a fierce, complicated struggle, especially
against Vietnam. We think this struggle will last a long time since Vietnam has
enormous ambitions. It wants to force Kampuchea into an Indochinese Federation
and will pursue expansionist aims in all of South-east Asia.
As for
living conditions, we have basically solved our problems by means of irrigation
projects. We are accumulating capital for the development of our country on the
basis of independence and self-reliance.
Having
the right political line was not enough to ensure victory .Our party had to
have, in addition, a firm revolutionary standpoint. This is partly because So
much of our struggle was illegal. Thus, sometimes, if our cadres were not
ideologically committed, they would surrender to the enemy or, once captured,
they would tell secrets. To avoid this, we stressed ideological education.
During the struggle, we encountered many difficulties. For example, cadres separated from their families and not ideologically firm would sometimes decide to run back to their families and away from the revolution. And sometimes cadres were working underground within the enemy administration and receiving very high wages. Lacking a firm revolutionary standpoint, they would be bought. Thus our party could see that ideology was the key factor in implementing the political line as well as the organizational line. Ideological party building was done in two ways: by destroying incorrect ideological standpoints and by building up the correct ideological standpoints of the party. For example, we had to:
(1) build up the ideological standpoint of the basic class in the party, the working class consciousness. To do this we had to define the different classes in our society and the contradictions between them. From this base, we armed our cadres ideologically with the viewpoints of the working class. This was done by explaining the spirit of sacrifice for the good of all and the need to abandon private ownership in favour of collective ownership; and by teaching them party discipline, love of party work, methods of self-criticism and ways to unite closely with the masses;
(2) build up the ideological standpoint of revolutionary patriotism and revolutionary internationalism, the first being the fundamental standpoint. By this we mean striving energetically to make our own revolution, struggling successfully against imperialism and revisionism in our own country. This advances and supports the international struggle. To speak only of internationalism while failing to carry out the revolution in one's own country is meaningless. We have to be concrete in this. We try to teach our people the principle of self-reliance in order to avoid making ourselves a burden for friendly countries. While they might like to help us, they must make their own revolutions and improve the living standard of their own people. Thus, we try as much as possible to avoid outside aid, to overcome all forms of suffering without seeking aid unless it is absolutely necessary .On the one hand, we try to avoid being too nationalistic, and on the other, to avoid being too internationalist;
(3) build up the ideological standpoint of constantly maintaining revolutionary ardour, especially the desire to be like ordinary people, especially the poor peasants. This is why our party cadres and our men and women in the army do not receive wages; they are told to serve the party and to receive only from the party. In this way, we avoid creating a new ruling class separated from the people;
(4) build up the concept of the mass outlook and of the mass line, that is, to have full confidence in the masses and to live among the masses, especially the poor peasants. Only by doing this can the revolution win victory and build its forces. We stress this to cadres because there are some who have petty bourgeois class backgrounds, specifically intellectuals who lack real confidence in the masses, especially in the poor peasants. We try to make them understand that these poor people can do everything. They conquered the enemy, do productive work and everything. Because they do everything, we must serve them;
(5) Cadres are also instructed in revolutionary vigilance, that is, taking care to be on guard against the enemy;
(6) We arm them with an understanding of dialectical materialism to enable them to analyse things and to understand the ideological standpoints of the party.
All of these ideological standpoints have been propagated in the branches and cells of the party. This was done not by the reading out of documents but by analysing daily activities, determining what was done wrongly and correcting shortcomings.
As for
our books, they are only a few pages in length, as brief documents are more
suitable for poor peasants. We also have some courses, mostly short ones for
small groups -in underground work for two to three people-once or twice a
month. There are also other courses held about twice a year in which party
members are introduced to revolutionary concepts and educated in our political,
ideological and organizational line.
Even
now, after liberation, we believe the ideological factor is the determining
factor. In cadre education, we place stress on destroying old society
ideological standpoints which remain powerful. Among leading cadres, we also
stress the defending and building up of working class consciousness. This is to
avoid revisionism. When a party becomes revisionist, it is not because the
ordinary member becomes revisionist but because the leadership leads the party
towards revisionism. Although we say very little about revisionism outside the
party, inside the party we have fought a lot against revisionism. It is partly
for this reason that we avoid using the documents of others. We rely mostly on
our own assessments of class struggle. This is more concrete. Some of our
cadres who have lived overseas, and who worked with foreign communist panics,
regularly request foreign documents, claiming we neglect the study of Marxism-Leninism.
But we tell them that Marxism-Leninism develops by means of the struggle of the
people; our experiences are genuine Marxist-Leninist documents.
We
build the party ideologically and organizationally by relying on our class
analysis, taking the poor peasant and worker classes as the basic classes.
Those who joined from the petty bourgeoisie or other classes tried to promote
the standpoints of those classes, but they had to renounce their old
standpoints and develop working class consciousness. Cadres are evaluated on
the basis of their concrete activities. Their spirit has to be clean
uncorrupted and without entangling contacts with the enemy. We investigate life
histories and class background both before and after they join the revolution.
We do this to prevent infiltration by, for example, CIA, KGB or Vietnamese
agents. By adopting these organizational principles, we have unity in the party
and can cleanse our party of bad elements.5 We have not been 100 per
cent successful. The enemy is still attempting to undermine the party.
Consequently, we are striving to strengthen political and ideological education
and to clean the party.
In summation, we can say that our party is integrated and united through this political, ideological, and organizational work. It has become stronger and stronger. We have learned that, as soon as you have a strong and clean party, you will have a strong revolutionary movement. We still have some distance to travel on this path, and the enemy, both the imperialists and the revisionists as well as the Vietnamese, continue to fight us. Thus, the building of the party continues from one generation to the next. We hope to avoid the possibility of the next generation becoming revisionist. If we can guard safely the interests of our country, we will also contribute to the struggle in the whole world. We know about the emergence of revisionism in the Soviet Union and we are saddened by this. And about the destruction of the Indonesian party by the enemy. We have learned from these experiences, and the experiences of other parties. We have tried not to fall by the wayside.
Question: Is
there a danger ? from outside the country or inside the party ? a danger of a
new class being created?
To
clarify the nature of the struggle inside the party, yes, there are both
dangers. Inside the party, there is a contradiction between the standpoints of
private ownership and collective ownership. If we do not take care, it may
become antagonistic. The other contradiction is external. Vietnam, in
particular, is trying to undermine our party by military, political, economic
and ideological means. The Vietnamese also try to infiltrate our party. We are
not worried about the external, military aggression. We worry most of all about
the enemy inside.
Question: Why is
illegal work still the fundamental or basic work?
In this
period, after liberation, it is secret work
that is fundamental. We no longer use the terms 'legal' and 'illegal'; we use
the terms 'secret' and 'open'. Secret work is fundamental in all that we do.
For example, the elections of comrades to leading work are secret. The places
where our leaders live are secret. We keep meeting times and places secret, and
so on. On the one hand, this is a matter of general principle, and on the
other, it is a way to defend ourselves from the danger of enemy infiltration.
As long as there is class struggle or imperialism, secret work will remain
fundamental. Only through secrecy can we be masters of the situation and win
victory over the enemy who cannot find out who is who.
This
also applies to foreign affairs. For example, the Soviet Union asked to come to
Phnom Penh at liberation. They were preparing to send men to the Embassy. We
said we could not possibly receive them and they were furious. We base
everything on secrecy. This is in the interests of the working classes.
Question: Why do
you not mention the Soviets externally?
Inside
the party we struggle resolutely against the Soviet Union, but we have many
enemies now ? US imperialism, Thailand, Vietnam ? and for tactical reasons we
must limit our enemies as much as possible. It should be clear that we oppose
the Soviet Union and revisionism, but our line has to be different from the
line taken in China because we are a small country.
Take another example: our attitude towards 'the three worlds'. We have the same standpoint, exactly the same, but as for what we do, we have to bear in mind the concrete interests of our country.
Question: Do you
have a party programme?
Yes we
have one but only in Kampuchean. We still have many tasks; we have not done
enough propaganda work internationally. The Vietnamese enemy has been able to
make so much international propaganda against us because of shortcomings in our
propaganda work in the international arena.
V. On
Concrete Work Before and After Liberation
Before liberation, legal activities concerned work undertaken by different organizations such as the students' union, workers' associations, women's association and other organizations. We did everything we were allowed to do under the enemy's laws. There are also sub-categories of non-legal or non-open activities: semi-open and semi-secret forms or semi-legal and semi-illegal forms. Celebrating May 1st, for example, was both legal and illegal. Even though the ruling class might have caught us, we celebrated May 1st We maintained the tradition once it was established. Perhaps it is different in your place.
The
Communist Party of Kampuchea has never before been legal. This is also true of
other progressive organizations we created. We developed the tactic of secrecy,
firstly, to defend ourselves, secondly, to mobilize more forces, and finally to
serve our struggle, for example, in mobilizing intellectuals. We found they
would not join us if we used semi-illegal forms, but with legal forms such as
celebrations and visiting temples, they joined in. Thus, we made them join us
step-by-step. Many semi-secret and semi-illegal and secret activities were
organized so as to protect the wholly illegal and secret activities of the
party centre. Thus, when the enemy attacked from outside, he struck
semi-illegal and semi-secret activities only and we were able to defend our
party and its leadership. In the neo-colonial, semi-feudal society, we had to
work in complete secrecy, both inside the party and inside other organizations.
This also applied to party members working among the masses. Since liberation,
we continue secret work because we consider the strategic line to be more
important than tactics. We have published the names of only a few of our cadres
and members. Not many need to be public. During the war, all of them were
secret in this area, we learned from the bloodstained experience of the
Communist party of Indonesia.6
Operating secretly, our organization has the following rules. Three members are required to form a cell, for example in a factory. If there are more than three members, a cell secretary must direct party work. If there are up to six people, we form two separate cells having no contact with each other. Even with five people we organize two separate party cells, which work secretly and separately. If the enemy discovers one cell, the other can continue its work. There are no direct contacts among cells. In each factory, there is one leading cadre. Only he knows this. He can go directly to the leadership. These procedures also apply to other sectors such as students. We form cells having no knowledge of each other and which are unable to contact each other. The same applies to contacts between the designated leading cadre and the leadership. Contacts are arranged through a third person. If the enemy captures the leading cadre, he will not be able to identify the leadership, only the go-between. This is our secret organization.
From
our experience, secrecy is only one aspect of building up the organization. Of
greater importance is the ideological level of the designated leading cadres.
They must display great discipline. We had to be especially careful when work
had to be done in the cities. Cadres can be forced to leave in a hurry. They
should not live with their families. When they do, things get complicated. It
takes them longer to escape. We have had some bitter experience with these
things. Afterwards, we decided to observe party discipline more strictly.
Permit me to say that we are speaking of concrete experiences and conditions in
our country. It is up to you to decide what you can learn from these
experiences. We offer these examples out of friendly revolutionary feelings.
Secrecy
meant avoiding the law. For example, we had to make our own identity cards so
that our names would not appear in the register. If the enemy captured genuine
identity cards, photos and work permits, it would have been easier to find us.
Also, if revolutionaries did not have any work, the enemy might have noticed
us. We opened a bookshop for ourselves, but to avoid letting out any of our
names, we took shelter behind a third person and his name. During the war many
cadres had to leave their jobs periodically, and we had to protect them.
Contacts and meetings were at night; so were political training classes. We
locked ourselves up in a room for two or three days until we were finished.
Contacts between publicly well-known leaders, such as those who worked in
parliament, and secret leaders were arranged through two or three other
persons. We employed various tactics to overcome the oppression of the enemy.
For meetings in a house, for example, we used signals, such as a scarf in front
of the house. If the scarf was in place, it was safe to enter it; if it was
not, the enemy was there. In the beginning we lost many people because the
enemy knew the secret signals. From this we learned not to go directly into the
house but to walk around the neighbourhood, maybe go into a shop, drink
something and ask about what was happening in the house. Sometimes good people
would tell us in confidence about the enemy. Sometimes the neighbours were not
revolutionaries, but they would warn us if spies and agents were there.
We also
used couriers for messages, letters, carrying ammunition, etc. Couriers were
not allowed to know our real places of residence. Other- wise, captured
couriers could be forced to reveal them. We had to use a bridge of two or three
other persons. If a messenger failed to show up, we did nothing for two to
three days. But after this, we had to move elsewhere. When the enemy learned
this, they tortured captured couriers right away so as to catch us. From bitter
experience, we learned to abandon a safe house at once if a messenger was two
to three hours late. The enemy came immediately a few times and we had to use
arms in order to allow leading cadres to escape. This should give you an idea
of our experiences. The tactics and techniques are of secondary importance
only; most important is the class standpoint of cadres.
Since
liberation, our experience relates to anti-party activities organized inside
our party. They usually involve CIA, Vietnamese and KGB agents. Our experiences
in this area are very recent, but it appears from what we have been able to
learn that CIA, Vietnamese and KGB agents have been working inside the party
for a long time. When we observed that something was wrong, we thought it was
an internal contradiction and attempted to resolve it by means of persuasion,
self-criticism and so on. For example, the party had to give directives to a
branch concerning the living conditions of the people. When nothing changed, we
realized something was wrong. Where there were deviations to the left or to the
right, we looked carefully into the backgrounds of the cadres. We also sought
the opinion of the masses. We have thus been able to uncover enemy agents
step-by-step. Generally, we discovered they had been engaged in enemy
activities for a very long time. Sometimes good comrades had been imprisoned
and tortured and afterwards they surrendered to the enemy. Upon release, they
served as agents. We welcomed them back, accepted them, without looking at what
had happened in prison. We now realize they had become agents of the enemy.
It is
more widely known that the USA planned to seize power from us six months after
liberation. The plan involved joint action on the part of the USA, the KGB and
Vietnam. There was to be combined struggle from inside and outside. But we
smashed the plan. Immediately after liberation, we evacuated the cities. The
CIA, KGB and Vietnamese agents there left for the countryside and were unable
to implement the plan. People who had infiltrated the party could not react
immediately, but we discovered them later when they planned coups d'état. Their activities were
coordinated with aggression from outside. These were not powerful people; their
intention was to exploit the opportunity provided by Vietnam's attacks to
assassinate our leaders and then announce it to the world. However, when the
Vietnamese attacked, our army defeated them and we caught the traitors inside
the party.
Although
we say plans have been crushed, we do not mean the enemy has given up. We have
to continue to build and to defend our party, and our leadership, and to
apprehend the people who have infiltrated our party. We know the current plan
involves not only Vietnamese agents, but has something to do with US
imperialism and the KGB. All of them! A similar thing has occurred in Yemen,
both North and South. And in Afghanistan. But as these things happen,
the face of the Soviets becomes more and more clear.
Question: Is it
co-operation between the CIA and KGB or is it rivalry for control of Kampuchea?
Both.
On the one hand they co-operate; on the other, they are rivals. For example,
Vietnam attacked us last October to December while the US conducted operations
near our coastal islands and along the border with Thailand with its CIA
agents. They compete for control at the same time. This is an open form of
co-operation. As for the secret one, some CIA agents joined up with the
Vietnamese in order to come to Kampuchea. Because the US was unable to come
into Kampuchea, it had to rely upon Vietnam. The Vietnamese do not discriminate
in choosing agents. They accept anybody who fights the Communist party of
Kampuchea. Even CIA agents!
The
leadership apparatus must be defended at any price. If we lose members but
retain the leadership, we can continue to win victories. Defending the
leadership of the party is strategic. As long as the leader- ship is there, the
party will not die. There can be no comparison between losing two to three
leading cadres and 200-300 members. Rather the latter than the former.
Otherwise the party has no head and cannot lead the struggle. This has been
demonstrated by the experience of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Its
leadership was 90 per cent destroyed. It has taken them a very long time to
re-establish themselves. Thirteen years have passed since 1965 and the party is
not yet rebuilt. We do not know how long it will take for them to regain the
offensive strength, which they had before. To build a good leadership is
strategic. It takes 10-20 years to build up a good leading communist. If you
lose one, you lose a lot. And party secrecy can be lost.
VI.
Building and Leading the Revolutionary Movement
As we have said, from 1960 we regarded the workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and progressive patriotic personalities as strategic forces. The working class is the progressive class while the largest class is the peasantry. The others are secondary, allied forces. The national progressive capitalists were secondary, tactical forces mobilized in particular instances. The next step was setting the strategic line. The rural struggle was the fundamental struggle. We divided our cadres between the towns and the countryside, according to their abilities. Before 1960 there was some confusion about this. We did not have a clear party line. We had developed bases in the countryside but the enemy had destroyed up to 90 per cent of them. Moreover, we were not strong in the cities. We realized in 1959 that we lacked the strategic forces necessary for advancing the revolution!
It was
only after 1960 that we could allocate our forces correctly. Most of them went
to work among the peasants; slightly fewer worked among the petty Bourgeoisie,
the students and intellectuals; a very few worked among national capitalists and
with high-ranking personalities in the administration. Once we had this line we
could very quickly build our forces. In particular, we built up rural base
areas. As the mass movement became stronger and stronger, we were able to build
up legal and illegal work. We could even mount mass demonstrations. From 1962
to 1963, in particular, our forces grew stronger and stronger.8
The
best of our cadres worked among poor peasants building base areas in the most
remote regions. They had to transform themselves so as to work among peasants.
Initially, there were a lot of problems. Meanwhile in the cities, cadres had to
become workers. The conditions in the cities and the countryside were quite
different in rural areas, living conditions were very bad but there were few
enemies. In the cities, living conditions were better but there were many
enemies. Both places had advantages and disadvantages. Cadres had to be
selected accordingly. There was a lot of malaria in the countryside. Some
cadres refused to work there, but we had work to do and we had to strengthen
their ideological standpoint.
When we
look back upon this period, we realize we would not have obtained such a big
victory without first overcoming such obstacles. We see two main turning
points: if we had not reorganized in 1960, we could not have launched the armed
struggle in 1968; if we had not launched the armed struggle in 1968, we would
not have been masters of the situation at the time of the 1970 coup d'état. The enemy might otherwise
have destroyed our forces. To be master of the situation, to rely upon your own
forces, to be sovereign ? these words have meaning only if we have the forces
of the people in our hands. If we do not, they will fall into the hands of the
enemy. The most important thing was to grasp the national forces in our
country. This was for us a major lesson.
We seek
to stress the right thing in gathering forces. This is important in all periods
of the revolution. Today, in the period of socialist revolution, our strength
is greater than it was during the national democratic revolution. Take, for
example, the petty capitalists who were evacuated from the cities. Initially
they had difficulties living in the countryside, but gradually they have become
proud of the revolution. They see the prospects for their children, that our
revolution is clean and that we are independent and sovereign. They know we can
defend ourselves from Vietnam, and they have confidence in us. As for the
intellectuals who have remained abroad, some support us. In France, an
association has expressed solidarity with us against Vietnam. We are stronger
now than in the first revolution: 85 per cent of the population belongs to the
revolution, as workers and peasants, and 80-90 per cent of the intellectuals
belong to it. Only ten per cent are different. We try to educate these people
so that they will see that the revolution is good for them and their children.
Thus we grow stronger and stronger.
We have
gathered forces from different strata in different periods because everyone
recognizes the patriotic spirit of the communists. The feudalists said bad
things about Vietnam and the USA without doing anything. They were corrupt and
let Vietnam come ? 100 kilometres, 200 kilometres, half a kilometre ? across
the border by corrupting the police.
The Vietnamese thus crawled into our country by what they tern 'legal' means, especially in Takeo and Svay Rieng. But when power came into the hands of the party, everyone saw that we could hold aloft the banner of independence. They realized communists were clean, that we live as ordinary people live, while in the old days, when people lived in a capitalist way, the society disintegrated. As soon as people understood, they followed the communist way and we could easily mobilize forces.
How did
we make Sihanouk join us? We were able to mobilize forces after the coup d'état because we had made
preparations for a long time. We were masters of the situation. We had an army;
we had some weapons. Thus, we were able to form a united front. We even allowed
King Sihanouk to become chairman of the front. It meant nothing because we were the masters of the situation.
Following the coup, Sihanouk was reduced from everything to nothing while for
us it was the opposite ? in the cities as well as in the countryside. Forces
from the basic levels of society were essential for getting top levels to join
us. That is the first lesson.
The
second lesson and experience concerns front activities. We did not have an easy
time of it. The enemy tried to corrupt Sihanouk ? the USA, the French, the
Soviet revisionists ? and to split him away from the front. Sihanouk did not
leave because we won victory after victory at the basic level. Sihanouk would
have left us had we not done so, especially in 1973 when Vietnam sat at the
negotiating table with the USA. Sihanouk was scared to be alone; he kept asking
if we were able to continue the struggle. He wanted to negotiate but we told
him we would continue the struggle to the end.
Thirdly,
we found we had to struggle inside the front with Sihanouk at the same time
that we united with him externally. Sihanouk asked for things; we let him have
them as long as this did not contradict our strategic policy. We had to be very
flexible towards him. The party slogan was 'Don't push anybody over to the
enemy'.
VIII.
The Urban Struggle, 1960-73
Our
struggle in the cities had two components: the legal struggle and the secret
struggle. The urban struggle was not as important as the struggle in the
countryside but its impact was felt all over the country and on an
international level. Moreover, the struggle had an important effect on the
middle level of the ruling class, in spite of the fact that the city was the
headquarters of the ruling class and its apparatus of oppression.
Some of the legal work was undertaken in the National Assembly. We did not attempt to obtain seats; we used patriotic personalities for making propaganda. These dignitaries did not act in the name of the party, but the party was in essence behind the propaganda. The work was limited. We just let our people use strategic slogans to arouse the people. At the same time, we used newspapers, promoted rumours and asked people to follow the deputies whom we had managed to get into the Assembly. In this way, we worked at the top, making people follow us while at the same time we worked at basic levels.
Although
we were able to work legally in the National Assembly, our deputies were
sometimes subject to repression. We would then try to sneak our ideas into
other deputies by telling them, 'If you say this and this, people will follow
you and elect you again'. And sometimes they tried it. When our slogans were
used before the people, the people applauded. The deputies were pleased. Later
they would ask us what to say and we would then sneak more of our slogans into
them. Some of our comrades could not understand this and thought that by doing
this we might strengthen the influence of the ruling class. But we did not think
it did any harm. If we could get some of the essence of our ideas to the
people, then we could get some of these people with us. There were difficulties
in the struggle with our newspapers.
When
the ruling class realized a particular newspaper had been secretly established
by the party, it would be closed in less than three months. We would then let
comrades write anonymously for newspapers of a more neutral nature. Sometimes
the paper would cut out half the words. We did it nonetheless; to get some ideas
out. We also let our people respond to reactionary newspaper articles, by
writing letters to the editor asking the paper to stop printing reactionary
views. In the case of the most reactionary papers, those that could not be
restrained in any other way, we called for mass demonstrations at their
offices. In the case of Phnom Penh
Presse, a CIA newspaper and the
most reactionary of them all, we let the people sack the place.9 Among our
other activities in the cities, we promoted artistic performances among the
people and arranged travel to rural areas for festivals, ceremonies, and so on.
We were thus able to make our forces stronger and stronger at all levels of the
society.
Choosing
the right slogan, the slogan that suited the situation ? asking not too much,
not too little in the situation ? was crucial to our work in the cities. We did
not use words like 'revolutionary', 'communist', or 'red', for example. Instead
we used words everyone would accept such as 'Fight US Imperialism', 'Fight for
Sovereignty', etc. People were especially scared of words such as 'communist'
and 'revolutionary'. But we made them adopt our party line, in its essence, by
putting out the party line. If in this way we could make people adopt the line
? people who were otherwise afraid of 'revolution' and 'communism' ? then those
people, in spite of their fears, were able to hold aloft our party flag.
We even worked within the movement of Buddhist monks, making them follow us by saying we would defend the country and religion. If the country were to become dominated by foreigners, there would no longer be any religion. So monks, too, held aloft our banner even if they did not like communism. We worked not only among the rank-and-file monks ? they were not so reactionary, in any case ? but also among high-ranking monks who controlled large parts of the country. We used slogans opposing foreign suppression of the culture of Kampuchea. Monks then became patriotic, supporting us without being aware of it.
We also
worked with high personalities such as Penn Nouth.10 Here, we had to
be careful. We had to solicit his ideas, not make propositions, not propagate.
The high-ranking patriotic personalities were not an important force but we
were trying to gather all forces in support of the struggle, especially in the
cities. We asked, for example, 'What would your Excellency think if the USA
attacked the country?' He would then think about it and we would sneak in ideas
about what had to be done. The dignitaries then listened to us and spoke to
others under their influence. Thus Penn Nouth did not know that he propagated
for the communists.
These
were the different forms of legal struggle in the cities. However, we put most
stress upon the secret struggle. Without the secret struggle, the legal
struggle would not have succeeded. These two forms of struggle interacted and
complemented each other, but the secret work was the most important.
We had
to educate our cadres all the time about secret as well as legal work. When the
situation was easy, cadres wanted to work legally so as to have the chance to
gain a title, money, etc. And when the situation was difficult, they preferred
instead to work secretly. Consequently they had to be educated continuously, so
as to be able to remain firm at their posts even at the risk of their lives.
They could not assume new duties on their own, before the party gave
authorization. This was ideological work.
Anticipating
difficulties, we took precautions. We set up bases in the countryside that
would receive people engaged in secret work in the cities. Once secrecy was
broken, however, those comrades were not allowed into secret work in the
countryside. Once out in the open ? always open work. We had to be careful
about where people went so that no one knew in advance. If they did, the enemy
could find out.
When
cadres had trouble, they often asked to be sent to the countryside even when
secrecy remained unbroken. Because of this we had to work step-by-step with
their ideological standpoint, and we had to keep an eye on those working in the
cities ? either secretly or legally ? observing especially their living
conditions and personal circumstances. Those working secretly could not hold
jobs as ordinary people did, so we had to assist them in finding jobs to some
extent.
In
accordance with the party's correct line, we were able to build and to defend
our forces. Some were destroyed by the enemy, but for the most part we were
able to protect them; especially after the coup in 1970 when we had large
liberated areas. The locations of our most important bases were a secret. Even
US electronics could not discover them. Although US bombings destroyed a lot,
they were not very effective because we stuck to our secret line of struggle.
Vietnamese forces in Vietnam were less well-hidden and less secret than we were
and because of that more of them were destroyed. Even the Vietnamese here were
hit more often than we were.
Our people and soldiers called the B-52s 'the blind ones'. When they came, they dropped bombs without looking. They did not care whether they hit anything or not. Our people were not too afraid of the B-52s.
We
learned that as long as we preserved our secrecy, our struggle could continue
as long as necessary. Even US-made artillery was ineffective when it was not
known who or where we were. Within limits. Some of us were hit But we told our
cadres not to be afraid, to keep themselves well hidden and then we would all
be able to throw out the US imperialists.
[Nuon
Chea concluded his statement at this point as the time allocated for the
meeting had elapsed.]